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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The act by a single taxpayer of taking the items out of
inventory for use by the same taxpayer in a construction contract
does not constitute a retail sale for the purpose of sales tax.

STATEMENT

OF THE CASE

On September 19, 1990, this Court filed its Opinion in
response to the Petitioner/Plaintiff's Appeal From Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission.
By

this

Petition

for

Rehearing,

Petitioner/Plaintiff

("Tumurru") requests the Court reconsider and rehear a portion of
its Opinion dated September 19, 1990.

1

ARGUMENT
The sole question presented in this Petition for Rehearing
concerns the portion of the Opinion of the Court set forth on the
top of page 8 which reads as follows:
"In the instant case, the seller was Tumurru and the
buyer was the contracting arm of Tumurru. The act of
taking the items out of inventory for use in a
construction contract is a retail sale for the purpose of
sales tax because the contractor is the ultimate
consumer, Tumurru was not obligated by any contract to
may physical delivery across state boundaries to its own
contracting arm, and Tumurru's contracting arm took
possession and title to the items in Utah. Tumurru is
therefore liable for the sales tax due on those items
sold to its contracting entity for use in out-of-state
construction projects. . . . "
(underscoring added)
We believe the question presented in this portion of the
Opinion is worthy of reconsideration by the Court inasmuch as the
question involves a basic concept in taxation, that is, whether a
single taxpayer, Tumurru in this case, creates a 'taxable event1 by
making an internal administrative decision to use a particular part
of its inventory for a specific purpose.
This question was discussed in detail in the Reply Brief for
the Petitioner.

A portion of the Reply Brief for the Petitioner

provides as follows:
"Building materials purchased by Tumurru were not
subject to sales or use tax at the time of purchase from
a vendor under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12102 and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103, exempting from sales
or use tax purchases for resale.
In Levine v. State Bd. of Equalization of the State
of California, 299 P.2d 738, 743 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956) the court outlined the rationale for this rule as
follows:
"There are many situations which develop in the
ordinary course of business where the purchaser is
unable to determine at the time of the purchase whether
he will in fact resell the articles purchased or will
2

use them. The resale certificate provisions of the law
were enacted to permit the purchase to be tax free under
these cirojmstances until such time as the ultimate
disposition of the property is determined. If that
disposition is a resale, in the form of tangible
personal property, then no tax is due with respect to
the original sale. If that disposition is for a use
other than retention, demonstration, or display, while
holding it for sale in the regular course of business,
then a tax is due because the property was not purchased
for resale. ..."
The Court has held that an administrative
determination by Tumurru that it would use building
materials purchased in Utah, then on hand and then
located in Utah, constitutes a sale, utilization or
conversion of the building materials to or with itself
thus obligating Tumurru to pay sales tax at the time of
such administrative determination.
The Court also held that such an administrative
determination, as a matter of law, is a transfer within
Utah.
Tumurru suggests that such an administrative
determination by Tumurru does not result in the ultimate
use or conversion of the building materials and is not a
sale, exchange or other disposition of the property and
that no sale, exchange or other disposition of the
property occurs until the (1) transfer of title and/or
physical possession to an outside purchaser, or (2)
actual physical utilization of the property in the
construction of the real property improvements."
Counsel has reviewed Federal income tax law, state income tax
law and sales and use tax law and can find no decisions or other
authority which would support the decision of the Court to the
effect that "The act of taking the items out of inventory by a
single taxpayer for use by the same taxpayer in a construction
contract is a retail sale for the purpose of the sales tax . . ."
Taxable events do not occur until there is some transaction
wherein title is transferred to another taxpayer.
If the law is as suggested by the Court in this case, the
administrative difficulties in administrating the tax laws would be
3

insurmountable since each taxpayer would be required to keep its
books and file its tax returns on the basis of day to day
administrative decisions.

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for those set forth in
the Reply Brief for the Petitioner/Plaintiff, Tumurru respectfully
requests the Court rehear and reargue this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 1990.

)CK, ESQ.
COUNSELLOR PETITIONER
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IN THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE STATE OF

TUMMURRU TRADES, I N C . ,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,

UTAH

:
:
Appeal No. 8 9 - 0 2 0 9

v.

J

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

J

Respondent/Defendant.

REPLY
1.

J

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT OF
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT

The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) ,

effective July 1, 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real
property improvements.
2.

Sales or use tax is not due from Tummurru merely by an

administrative determination by Tummurru that building materials
owned by Tummurru and located within Utah will be used in the
construction of out-of-state real property improvements or will be
used by Tummurru in the construction of components to be used in
the construction of out-of-state real property improvements.

ARGUMENT
1. The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) ,
effective July 1# 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real
property improvements.
1

The amendment of the statute described in Madsen v. Borthick.
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), cited by Respondent/Defendant reflected
a change in the law which the legislature could have enacted at any
time, without any constitutional limitations.
The change in the law in Madsen, supra, related to charges in
the law relating to suits brought against state employees for
actions taken in the course of their employment and did not involve
constitutional limitations.
The Commission is presumably arguing that the enactment of a
statute by the legislature creating a rule of law which could have
been or is not constitutional, creates, by legislative enactment,
a presumption that the rule was constitutional

prior to the

enactment of the statute.
Tummurru submits there is no authority for such an argument.
To the contrary, whether a rule of law (i.e. in this case relating
to sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property
located outside of this state) is or is not constitutional will be
determined on its own merits.

2. A sale subject to sales or use tax is not created by the
determination by Tummurru that building materials located within
Utah will be used in the construction of out-of-state real property
improvements or will be used by Tummurru in the construction of
components to be used in the construction of out-of-state real
property improvements*
Building materials purchased by Tummurru were not subject to
sales or use tax at the time of purchase from a vendor under the

2

provisions

of Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-12-102 and Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-12-103, exempting from s a l e s or use tax purchases for r e s a l e .
In Levine v.

State

Bd. of

Equalization

of

the

State

of

C a l i f o r n i a , 299 P.2d 738, 743 (Cal. D i s t . Ct. App. 1956) the court
o u t l i n e d t h e r a t i o n a l e for t h i s r u l e as follows:
'•There are many situations which develop in the ordinary
course of business where the purchaser is unable to determine at the
time of the purchase whether he will in fact resell the articles
purchased or will use them. The resale certificate provisions of
the law were enacted to permit the purchase to be tax free under
these ciroimstances until such time as the ultimate disposition of
the property is determined. If that disposition is a resale, in the
form of tangible personal property, then no tax is due with respect
to the original sale. If that disposition is for a use other than
retention, demonstration, or display, *rtiile holding i t for sale in
the regular course of business, then a tax is due because the
property was not purchased for resale. . . . "
The Commission presumably argues in i t s Brief (p.19) t h a t an
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determination by Tummurru t h a t i t would use b u i l d i n g
m a t e r i a l s purchased in Utah, then on hand and then located in Utah,
constitutes

a sale,

utilization

or conversion of the

building

m a t e r i a l s t o or with i t s e l f thus o b l i g a t i n g Tummurru t o pay s a l e s
t a x a t the time of such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determination.
The

Commission

also

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e determination,

presumably

argues

that

such

an

as a matter of law, i s a " t i t l e 1 1

t r a n s f e r within Utah ( i . e . in P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f ' s

brief,

"The

s a l e between Tummurru, as a Utah wholesaler, and Tummurru, as a
general c o n t r a c t o r , with t i t l e t r a n s f e r r i n g in Utah).
Tummurru suggests t h a t such an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

determination

by Tummurru does not r e s u l t in t h e u l t i m a t e use or conversion of
the building materials

and i s

not a s a l e ,

exchange or

other

d i s p o s i t i o n of the property and t h a t no s a l e , exchange or other
d i s p o s i t i o n of the property occurs u n t i l the (1) t r a n s f e r of t i t l e

and/or p h y s i c a l possession t o an outside purchaser, or (2) a c t u a l
physical u t i l i z a t i o n of the property in t h e construction of the
r e a l p r o p e r t y improvements.
The f a c t s in Levine, supra, are c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from
those in t h e i n s t a n t case as follows:
a.

In Levine, supra, t h e a c t u a l physical assembly of t h e

p r o p e r t y occurred within t h e s t a t e .

In t h i s case, t h e actual

p h y s i c a l assembly occurred without t h e s t a t e .
b.

In Levine, supra,

t h e property was always t a n g i b l e

p e r s o n a l property and never became r e a l property,

unless,

for

example, by a specific COTitract between t h e purchaser-lessee and a
lessor.

In t h i s case, in a l l instances t h e property did u l t i m a t e l y

become r e a l property and became r e a l property without t h e s t a t e of
Utah.

CONCLUSION

For a l l
the Brief

of t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s ,

for the Petitioner/Plaintiff,

Tummurru T r a d e s ,

Inc.,

respectfully

U t a h S t a t e Tax Commission s h o u l d b e

and f o r t h o s e s e t f o r t h
the

submits

Petitioner/Plaintiff,
the decision

reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 1 1 t h d a y of May,

1990.

J . JA^r CUJ/LDCK, ESQ.
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

A

in

of

the
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It is argued that the trial court committed error and was guilty of misconduct in
that he told the jury that the overt acts
were "good overt acts". However, examination of the court's instruction in this
connection shows that the court did not
instruct the jury* that the overt acts were
good overt acts but stated that overt acts
proven were "good overt acts".

Nyman LEVINE and Emma Levine, limited
partner*, Isidore Levine, Sidney Rose and
Sid 6. Levine, general partners, doing business under the firm names of Santa Ft
Tank 4 Tower Company, Division of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and Acme
Tank Manufacturing Company, Division of
Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a limited
partnership, and Manny A. Rose, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
[22] Other complaints of appellant as STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the
to the instructions given are likewise withState of California, Defendant aad
out merit. It further appears that many of
Respondent.
the instructions offered by appellant were Hyman LEVINE and Emma Levine. limited
covered by other instructions or did not
partners, Isidore Levine, Freda Levine, Sidaccurately state the law and no prejudicial
ney Rose and Sid B. Levine, general parterror resulted from the refusal to give
ners, doing business under the firm aames
of Santa Fe Tank & Tower Company, Divithem.
sion of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and
Acme Tank Manufacturing Company, Dlvi[23] Finally, appellant contends that
slon of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a
the court erred by invading the province of
limited partnership, and Manny A. Rose.
the jury during its deliberations. No error
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
appears in this connection. The jury durv.
ing its deliberations returned to court for STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the
further instructions and at the request of
State of California. Defendant and
Respondent.
a juror, the court reread a portion of the
Civ. 21314, 21315.
instructions given relative to the question
of the liability of persons charged with a
conspiracy for the acts and declarations
of persons not members of such conspiracy.
The court then informed the jury that a
person who committed a criminal act without having knowledge of a conspiracy
would not be guilty thereof. It appears
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed
on the law applicable to the charges set
forth in the indictment and that the court
did not invade the province of the jury
during its deliberations.

District Court of Appoal. Second District,
Division 1. California.
July 3, 105G.
Rehearing Denied July 30. 3956.
Hearing I>enk*d Auc 30. 10:»C
Two actions for recovery of taxes levied and collected under Sales and Use Tax
Law. The cases were consolidated for trial
in the Superior Court, Los Angeles County,
Ellsworth Meyer, J., and judgment in each
case went for the defendant State Board
of Equalization. Appeal* were taken from
the judgments and the District Court of
In view of what we have heretofore said, Appeal, Fourt, J., held that where purwe deem it unnecessary to pass on other chasers of materials entered into construcpoints raised by appellant.
tion contracts to fabricate and erect structures on real property out of state, the)
The judgment and order denying motion were essentially performing sen ices am!
for new trial are affirmed.
were consumers of the materials which.
they had purchased and were not encased
in the reselling of materials as persona!
BARNARD, P. J., and GRIFFIN. J., property.
Affirmed.
concur.

LEVINI ?. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION

Ctl.

739

CUe at 2*9 P.2d 73*

1. Licenses G=>l5.t(6)
Under S a k s and Use Tax Law as in
vficct before 1953 amendments, materials
purchased by California seller under certificates of resale and subsequently fabricated, sh'.ppcd and erected on out-of-state
job sites pursuant to contracts with out-of>tate purchasers were subject to the tax.
West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6009.1,
<>0:1, 6091-6094. 6201

Ann.Rev. & Tax Code, §§ 6009.1, 6051,
6091-6094.
5. Licenses 0 3 2 ( 1 )
Resale certificate provisions of Sales
and Use Tax Law were enacted to permit
purchase to be tax free, where purchaser
is unable to determine at time of purchase
whether he will in fact resell articles purchased or will use them, until such time as
ultimate disposition of property is determined. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§
6091-6094.

2. Commerce C=>64
Licenses C=>15.l(6)
Where materials were purchased by
California seller under certificates of resale and subsequently fabricated, shipped
and erected on out-of-state job sites pur-

6. Commerce C=>S4
Licenses C=»i5.i(6)
Subjection to imposition of taxes undcr Sa]cs a n J U s e T a x j ^ . of p u r c h a s e s of

snant to contract with out-of-state purchasers, such sales to California seller were
not exempt from sales and use taxes by virtue of statute relating to property exempted
by Constitution or federal law, nor was state
deprived of jurisdiction to collect tax by
virtue of Interstate Commerce Clause of
federal Constitution. West's Ann.Rev. &
Tax.Code. § 6352; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1,
§ 8. cl. 3.

gave resale certificates and then subsequently fabricated items which they installed on out-of-state job sites, did not conflict
with Interstate Commerce Clause of federal
Constitution, nor was extraterritorial effect
thereby given to the Sales and Use Tax
Law. West's Ann Rev. & Tax.Code. §§
6009.1, 6051, 6091-6094; U.S.C.A.Const. an.
1, § 8, cl. 3.

materials, purchased by contractors who

7. Licenses C=28
3. Licenses C=l5.i(3)
Partners engaged in business of conPurpose of resale provisions of Saks
structing tanks and other items which were and Use Tax Law is to relieve ordinal
fabricated pursuant to contracts and erected seller from payment of sales tax where
<.iv. real property outside the state were,property is boupht by purchaser for purpose
undi: fact> as shown by the record, ''con- of reselling- it in form of tangible personal
tractors" within meaning of law of Cali- property. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code,
fornia, and were "consumers*' for sales and §§ 6091-6095.
use tax purposes. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.
8. Licenses OI5.!(8)
Code. §§ 610Q.1, 6051, 6091-6094.
Legislature did not intend to permit
S « publication Words and Phrases,
purchasers to escape entirely, payment of
for other judicial constructions nm3 u'-fitax under Sales and Use Tax Law by sr.vnitious of "Consumers** and "Contracin£ of resale certificate if it later develtors".
oped that property was consumed or used
4. Estoppel C=>92(I)
rather than resold in form of tangible perWhere contractors in business of fab- sonal property, and. to prevent th:> possibilricating items avoided imme«i::tte payment ity, Legislature enacted section relating to
<«f sale- taxes on purchases of materials by the use of article bought for resaie. West's
giving resale certificates as provided by Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §£ 6091-6095.
statute, they had no standing to attempt
in court to avoid condition- specified in
*
Mich statute, by reference to other statutes
\Yad c worth & Eraser, by E. L. Fraser,
and by charges of inconsistency. West's Los Angeles, for appellants.

740
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Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., James £. performed at Sanla Rosa. The items fabSaV.ne, A>>t. Atty. Gin . Edward Sumner, ricated were either (1) sold and merely »h
Dan Kaufmann, and James C. Maupin, IiviTcd to the job sites specified by cu>Dv-puty Attys. Gen., for respondent.
tomers, or (2) erected on the customers* joi»
sites by appellants. Out-of-state shipments
FOURT, Justice.
were made by railroad car with appeliar.t>
Appellants brought two actions for the as consignee at the out-of-state job s:u.
recovery of taxes levied and collected un- Appellants' erection superintendent took
der the California Sales and Use Tax Law. possession of the shipment upon arrival
The cases were consolidated for trial and and with the assistance of local labor superjudgment in each case went for the defend- vised the erection work. No deficiency tax
assessments were made upon ont-of-s:nt<
ant.
One action, Case Number 21314, is for sales not involving erection. The business
the recovery of taxes in the amount of S°,- was a specialty in that the items fabri717.17, with interest levied during the peri- cated consisted almost entirely of item>
od from February 1, 1949, to September 30, specifically engineered for a particular cus1951.
The second action, Case Number tomer.
21315, is for the recovery of taxes in the
sum of SI,940.IS, with interest levied during the period from July 1, 1948, to January
31, 1949. Except for the taxable periods,
the legal and factual issues in each action
are substantially the same.

The instant appeals involve tax and interest measured by the price paid by appellants for materials which were purchased
in California, ex tax under resale certificates. The raw materials were first placed
in inventory in California and, as orders
were received for the erect:on of one of
the completed structures to be manufactured
and installed by appellants, after the design and engineering work was done, the
necessary raw materials were withdrawn
from inventory as required, and fabricated
in California for subsequent erection and
installation by the appellant- outside Ca; foraia on customers' job sitc c The purchase, storage and fabricator, of tru materials all took place in this state.

The appellants were engaged in designing, engineering, fabricating, selling and
installing water cooling towers, aerial towers and industrial wooden products especially designed for industrial processing
The business headquarters were located in
Los Angeles, and their principal fabricating
p*»a.nt, storage and lumber yard were located at Santa Rosa, California.
Customers' purchase orders were firs: s\nt to
the Los Angeles ofhet where design and
engineering work was performed. The orders were then forwarded to Santa Rosa.
We are concerned with the provisions ut
accompanied by requisitions to inventory. the law as it existed during the taxabie peFabrication and loading for shipment were riods. 1
I. K^vcDtif- DDd Taxation Codr- so'-imn^:
"fc i*0C*f».l. What Dor iiichidi'd in \<t<»r*i£c' or 'use.' •Stomp'-' am! 'us** d«» t;<»t
include the k^^pins. retain ire or c ^ r risin^ any ri;rht or power OVT tamrihlo
|K»r<on:il property shipped or brought
IDTO tiii> Slate f*»r th»- purpM>e of sui ^»quontly transporting it OUSHIO th" Si..t»»
lor use thereafter s<>h iy outbid*1 the
State, or for the purpose of bfinir processed, fabricated, or manufiiftur.-d into, att.i'-bt^d to or incorporated intu. oth-r
tangible personal prop* rfy to hv transported outside the State and thereafter
used sole)} outside the State/'

".$ C/dl.
Imposition ::uc rat«- of trx.
T«r the prJvih-2.' of s» li::;^ Ta:;^ii»}. p-r*-«•::.'.] property at retail u !:.A i« l»i»r«-l»v
isr.pos.-d up"u nil retaihrs a: t)••* r.a:» i»f
22v pon-vnt of tin pr</«s rf-«-ipi< •••
any retailer from the sale of all tai^ih'•
pTSon.nl property soli] a; r-ia"! in t:i»*
Stato on or nft<T Aurus: 1. lO.'t.. nud io
and including June .'10, 1fi.T». nnd nt tl:»*
rate of o percent thereafter, and at Ibr
rat«- of 2 1 ,- percent OD :J:I«J after .luly
1. 1*M'\ rind to nud inHn^ing Jnn« ."if>.
VMU, and at the rate of JI percent thereafter."

LEVINE ?. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
Cite** :i9P.:dT3*
In 1953, section 6 0 ^ . 1 was amended by
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chaser may elect to include in his gr< ss re-

strikinc therefrom the word< "shipped or

ceipts the amount of the rental

brought into this State".

rather

In the same year,

seciion 6094 was amended as follows:
M

§ 60.M.

certificate

If

a purchaser who gives a
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than

the cost sales

property to him."

charged

price of

the

(Italics indicating addi-

tions made to the section.)

makes any use of the properly

Where the purchaser gave a valid rc-

other than retention, demonstration, or dis-

sale certificate pursuant to sections 6091-

play while holding it for sale in the reg-

6093, and the gross receipts involved were

ular course of business, the use shall be

accordingly not included in the measure of

deemed a retail sale by taxable to the pur-

the sales tax imposed upon the vendor, any

chaser under

Chapter 3 of this part as of

use by the purchaser other than mere re-

the time the property is first used by him,

tention,

and the cost sales price of the property to

holding the property for sale in the regular

demonstration

or

display

while

him shall be deemed the gross receipts from

course of business was under section 6094 as

such retail sale the measure

of the tax.

it read during the period involved herein.

there is an unsatisfied use tax

and prior to the section's amendment in

Only tihen
liability

on this

basis shall

the seller be

19S3, deemed a retail sale by the purchaser

liable for sales tax with respect to the sale

and subject to the sales tax measured by

of the property

the purchaser's cost.

to the purchaser.

If the

The amendment of

sole use of the property other than reten-

1953 provided that the use of tangible per-

tion, demonstration, or display in the reg-

sonal property, other than retention, dem-

ular course of business is the rental of the

onstration or display, for sale in the reg-

property while holding it for sale, the pur-

ular course of business by the one who pur-

"$ 0091. Presumption that gross receipts subject to tax: Burden of proof.
F«»r the purpose of th<- proper administr.iiioD of this part ace to prevent evasion of the sales tai it shall be presumed
that all gross receipts are subject to the
tax until the contrary is established.
Tiif burden of proving that a sale of
tangible personal property is Dot a sale
at retail is upon the person who makes
the sale unkss be take> from the purchaser a certificate to the effect that the
property is purchased for resale.**
**£ C.OU2. Purchaser's certificate that
purchase for resale: Sufficiency to relieve seller of burden of proof. The certificate relieves the seller from the burdeD
of proof only if taken in pood faith from
a p« rson who is engaged in the b u s i c s s
of selling tangible personal property and
who holds the permit provided for in
Article 2 of this chapter and who, at
the time of purchasing the tangible p«.TFana! property, intends to S'll it in the
regular course of business or i^ unable TO
ascertain at the time of purchase whether
the property will be sold or will be used
for s'»nie other purpose."
*"| OOfKl. Same: Execution, form, and
contents. The certificate *.hall be signed
by and bear the name and address of the
purchaser, shall indicate the number of
the permit issued to the purchaser, and
shall indicate the general character of
the tangible personal property sold by the

purchaser in the regular course of business. The certificate shall be substantially in such form as the board mru prescribe."
"§ (lOTM. Effect of using article bought
for resale. If a purchaser who gives a
certificate makvs any use of the property
other than retention, demonstration, or
display while holding it for sale in thf
regular course of business, the use shall
be deemed a retail sale by the purchaser
as of the rime the property is firs: used
by him. and th«- cos: of the property to
him shall be deemed the grosv ree t ipts
from such retail sale. If the sob- use
of the property other than retention,
demonstration, or display in the regular
course of business is the rental of the
property while bonding it for sale, the
purchaser n;:;y fleet to incJud in hi*
gross receipt* the amount of tb* rental
charged rather than the cost of thr property \" Irim.*"
"s" OJCO. Imposition ani rare of tax.
An rxris- tax is hereby in.posed on the
stor.'.g* , use. or other con<-.;m:;ion m this
State of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer on or aft< r July
3, in:;T>f for <:r<rn?rJm D sr. 0 r other consumption in this State at the rate of 3 percent of the salts price of the pr«-p» rry.
and at the rate nf 2 ^ percent or. and
after July 1. l^-JS. and to and including
June 30, 19-Jf>. and at the rate of 3 percent thereafter."'
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"Respondent argrues that it ha? never been
chased the property under a valid retail
certificate is subject to the use tax imposed the intent or effect of the code provisions
bv section 6201, rather than the sales tax to tax the transactions here involved and
refers us to the declaration to that effect
imposed by section 6051.
by
the legislature when it passed the exDuring the times with which we arc conclusionary
section 6019. If the existing
cerned, section 1921 of the California Adlaw
taxed
these
transactions, and we hold
ministrative Code, relating to the Board of
that
it
did,
then
the legislature could not
Equalization—Sales and Use Tax (being
change
the
law
by
declaring that it had
formerly known as Board of Equalizanever
intended
to
tax
them.
tion Sales and Use Tax Ruling No. 11), provided in substance as is set forth in the foot" T h e usual purpose of a special interprenote hereto. 2
tative statute is to correct a judicial interpretation of a prior law which the Legis[1] Appellants' contention, in substance,
lature determines to be inaccurate. Where
is that prior to the 1953 amendment, the
such statutes are given any effect, the effect
Sales and Use Tax Law was ambiguous
is prospective only. This seems correct, for
with respect to the taxation of materials
any other result would make the Legislature
purchased by a California seller under cera court of last resort.' (2 Sutherland Stattificates of resale and subsequently fabriutory Construction, third edition, sec. 3004.)
cated, shipped and erected on out-of-state
"In any event the legislature could not
job sites pursuant to contract with out-ofretroactively
change what had been the
state purchasers, and that the 1953 amendlaw
by
declaring
what a preceding legisments to sections 6009.1 and 6094 should be
lature
had
meant
by
what it had said/' See,
construed as declaration of existing law.
also, Stockton Savings & Loan Bank v.
Before the 1953 amendment, section Massanet, 18 Ca!.2d 200, 114 P.2d 592;
6009.1 exempted from the definition of tax- Board of Social Welfare v. County of L. A.,
able storage and use, under certain cir- 27 Cal .2d 90. 162 P.2d 655; California Emcumstances, only the use of tangible per- ployment Stabilization Comm. v. Payne, 31
sonal property "shipped or brought into this Cal.2d 210. 187 P2z 7<C
State for the purpose of subsequently trans[2] The appellant further contends that
porting it outside the State for use therethe imposition of the tax violates the Comafter solely outside the State, * * V
merce Clause of the United States ConstiIn the case of People v. Grazer, 13S Cal. tution. The initial sales and purchases of
App.2d 274, 291 P.2d 957. 960, the court the materials by tht appellants were subject to a sales tax m that the property was
said:
2. The term "Contractor" as nsed in this
administrative ruling is defined as including both general contractors and subcontractors and including also contractors
engaged in such building trades ns carpentry, brick hying, cement work, steel
work, plastering, sh^et m»t;i! work, roofing, tile and terrazzo work, electrical
work, plumbing, hunting, air conditioning,
painting and interior decorating.
The term *'Oorr-tru< (ion Contracts" is
defined as a contmet for erecting a building or other structures on land and includes lump-sum. cost-plus and time-andmnterial contracts.
The term ''Materials" is defined as
tangible personal property which, wben
combined with other tangibh personal
property loses its identity to become an

integral and inseparable part of the completed structure. The ruling contains a
list of "materials" such as flooring, insulation, laths, lumber, oil. paint, piping,
valves, pipehtunrs. putty. r«»ons?. sheet
metal, steel, wutfimard, weath* rs: ripping,
wood prevrvf-r. etc.
The term "Kixtnres" is defined a* items
accessory to a building and which do not
lose their identity as accessaries when
pbif-ed or in<:;<Ih'd. such as lighting fixtures, et<\
The ruling sp«-cineaily provides in subdivision (b'i ill that "Contractors are
tb^ cm»Mii:irr> of materials used by them
in fulfilling construction contracts and
th*» tax applies to the sale of such material* to the contractors."

LEVIKX T. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
delivered to appellants at a point in the
state. Such sales were not exempt under
scction 6352 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code, nor was the state deprived of jurisdiction to collect the tax by virtue of the
Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

Cal.
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the purchase to be tax free under these
circumstances until such time as the uhimate disposition of the property is determined. If that disposition is a resale, in
the form of tangible personal property,
then no tax is due with respect to the onginal sale. If that disposition is for a use

[3] The appellants were encaged in the o t h e r t h a n retention, demonstration, or disbusiness of constructing tank, and the items Pla>"' w h l l c h o ] d i n S " f o r *nlc in the regular
heretofore mentioned, which were fabri- c o u r 5 e o f *>«iness, then a tax is due bccated pursuant to contracts to be erected c a u s c t h e P r o P c r t > w a * ™t purchased for
on real property outside of the state. In r e s a l c " However, under these circumstancour opinion they were, under the facts of c s ' t h e P c r 5 0 n w h o P* v * ^ r ^ 1 c "rtifithese particular cases, contractors within cate is required to pay a tax at the rate of
the meaning of the law of this state, and t h e » 1 c s t a x < b u t measured by the cost of
were consumers. It was said in General the property to him. The legislature apparElectric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, ently felt that it was fair to impose a tax
111 Cal.App.2d ISO, 3S7, 244 P26 427, 431: on the purchaser under these conditions
•' * * * Where the materials are com- because the seller could have collected rebined with other materials so as to lose imbursement for the tax from the buyer,
their identity and become part of the com- except for his reliance upon the resale cerpleted structure the contractor is deemed tificate.
to be the consumer
* * * »

of

such

materials

[4] But for the giving of resale certificates, the sales tax would have applied at
the time of the sale of the raw materials to
the appellants. By giving: the resale certificates appellants escaped reimbursing their
severs for the sales Tax at the time of the
initial purchases and sales. Such certificates relieved the seller of tru obligation
initially to pay the sales tax ar.d thus there
was no-necessity for the severs to collect
sales tax reimbursement from the appellants
as buyers. Having elected to accipt the
condition? of Article 3, Charter 2. Division
2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, sections 6091-6095, relative to resale certificates, the appellants arc in r.o pr,?:tivr: to
attempt to avoid the cond:t::-r.? of that Article by reference to other provisions in
the Code and by charges of inconsistency.
[5] There are many situations which
develop m the ordinary course of business
where the purchaser is unable to determine
at the time of the purcha-e whether he
will in fact resell the article- purchased or
will use them. The resale certificate provisions of the law were enacted to permit

[6] The appellants, in the instant cases,
both stored and fabricated the materials in
California, pursuant to construction contracts . they were not merely retaining
these materials, demonstrating them or displaying them while holding them for
sale in the regular course of business.
Furthermore, since all of these events look
place in California and were preliminary
to the actual shipment of the structures,
there can be. in our opinion, no application
of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
Federal Constitution. Southern Pacific Co.
v. Gabacher. 3*>'-. U.S. 167. 59 S.Ct. 5>'°.
83 L.Ed. 5%; Utah Power & Light Co.
v. Pfost. 2S6 U.S. 165. r2 S.Ct. 54S. 76 L.
Ed 105s: American Mfg. Co. v. St Louis,
250 U.S. 45°. }» S Ct. ^22, 63 L.Ed. 10S4.
In other word-, the appellants canr.r.t use
the resale certificate sccti«»n< to strip the
stan of its jurisdiction merely Wcausr the
ultimate and final use of the property took
place in anoth-r state as p a n of the continuing process of contracting
Appellants further contend that extraterritorial cfTec: is being jrivin to the California Sales and Use Tax Law m these cases
in that the contracting work was performed outside of the state of California.
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The actual erection of the structures was
only a portion of the contracting agreement. The agreement to erect the structures establishes the nature of the activities of the appellants as a contractor. However, all of the incidents with which the
instant cases are concerned, insofar as they
involve the applicability of the California
Sales and Use Tax Law, are incidents
which occurred in California. The property was bought and delivered in California
and a sales tax would have been paid but
for the giving of the resale certificates;
it was stored in California; it was determined that it would be dedicated to the performance of a construction contract and it
was removed from storage in California,
then fabricated in California, that fabrication consisting of the rendering of contracting services transforming the raw materials into the completed structures prior
to their being shipped outside of the state
for erection pursuant to the construction
agreements.

related the tax back to the initial purchase
to the extent that that purchase price is
controlling as to the measure of the tax.
There is nothing in sections 6091-6095 tc
indicate that the legislature intended in an;,
way to relate these particular provisionof law to problems dealing with inters!:.:,
commerce.
The appellants further argue that because the Board did not tax the sale oi materials by the appellants in knocked-dovr.
form to be delivered without erection at thout-of-state job sites, that the Board was
inconsistent in taxing the materials fabricated into structures in California pursuant to a construction contract calling for
erection of the structures in other states.
They further argue that in all cases the-y
were merely selling personal property and
should come within the Board's rule that
gross receipts from sales to manufacturers,
producers or processors of tangible persona!
property which becomes an ingredient or
component part of the tangible persona!
property which they manufacture, procucv
or process are not taxable. Where the
appellants had no construction contract but
were merely selling their materials to purchasers out-of-state, they were reselling
personal property. But where they entere:
into a construction contract to fabricate
and erect structures on real property, thay
were essentially performing services. As
to the construction contracts they wert
the consumers of the materials which the;.
had purchased. They were not reselling
these materials as personal property, but
were rather using them in the process of
fulfilling a construction contract, and thus
fall within the provisions of Board rule Nc.
11.

[7,8] Article 3 t Chapter 2, Division 2
of the Revenue and Taxation Code relates
entirely to resale certificates. The purpose
of the provisions of sections 6091-6095 is to
relieve the original seller from the payment
of sales tax where the property is bought
by the purchaser for the purpose of reselling it in the form of tangible persona!
property. Obviously, the legislature did
not intend to permit parties in this type of
transaction to escape payment of a ta~\
entirely by the giving of a resale certificate
if it later developed that the property was
consumed or used rather than resold in the
form of tangible personal property. To
prevent this possibility, the legislature enacted section 6094. Once it is established
that the property is not to be resold in the
Judgment afnrmed.
form of tangible personal property then the
tax is due and payable since the sales tax
was not paid at the time of the original
WHITE, P. J., and DORAX, J., concur.
sale. The legislature has required that the
Hearing denied; SCHAUER and M;purchaser must now pay the tax, but has COMBJJ., dissenting.

MADSEN *. BORTH1CK
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Richard D. MADSEN and Nancy Madsen,
Boyd A. Swensen and Beatrice Swenten, Blaine Anderson and Sheree
Anderson, Hope A. Hilton, Cynthia Hilton, Ralph M. Hilton, Gene Helland and
the Middle East Foundation, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Mirrin D. BORTH1CK, W. Smoot Brimhall, and John Does I to V, being former Commissioners of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 19704.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 12, 1988.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1989.

Investors brought suit against former
Commissioners of Department of Financial
Institutions individually claiming their
gross negligence resulted in loss of their
investment. The Third District Court. Salt
Lake Count}', David B. Dee, J., dismissed
on grounds of res judicata, sovereign immunity, and statute of limitations On appeal, the Supreme Court. Zimmerman, J..
held that: (1) res judicata was not applicable, (2) Government Immunity Act did not
apply, and (3) suit was not time barred due
to extension of statute of limitations by
dismissal of prior suit.
Reversed and remanded

1. Judgment <e=*540
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action
only if suit in which that cause of action is
being asserted and prior suit satisfy three
requirements: both cases involve same parties or their privies, claim which is allegedly barred must have been presented in
first suit or must be one that could have
and should have been raised there, and
first suit must have resulted in final judgment on the merits.

2. Judfment *»57(K4)
Since trial court, in dismissing earlier
action between investors and State Department of Finance Commissioners officially,
could not legitimately pass on merits of the
complaint, because plaintiffs had failed to
satisfy statutory notice requirements which
were a precondition to suit, claim preclusion did not prevent plaintiffs later suit
against Commissioners individually. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 41(b).
3. Pretrial Procedure e=>554
Dismissal of suit for "lack of jurisdiction" for failure to comply with rules of
civil procedure and court orders includes a
dismissal for failure to meet a precondition
to suit. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(b).
4. Pretrial Procedure c=*554
Plaintiffs failure to meet notice requirements under Government Immunity
Act was a failure to fulfill a precondition to
suit, and thus dismissal of such action was
for lack of jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953. 6330-11, 63-30-12; Rules Civ.Proc.. Rule
4Kb).
5. Judgment <s=>634
Under rules of issue preclusion, adjudication of an issue bars its relitigation in
another action if issue in both cases was
identical, judgment was final with respect
to that issue, issue was fully, fairly and
competently litigated in first action, and
party who is precluded from litigating the
issue was either a party to the first action
or a privy of party.
6. Judgment C=>702
Since, under law applicable in 1980.
State did not have a duty to indemnify
Commissioners of Department of Financial
Institutions in suit brought against them
for activities arising out of their duties, but
only had duty to defend them, plaintiffs
were not required to file notice of claim
against officers with State prior to bringing suit against Commissioners individually
under the Act; thus! prior dismissal of suit
against Department and Commissioners officially did not have issue preclusive effect
on later suit by same plaintiffs against the
Commissioners individually. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-11. 63-30-12; U.C.A.1953. 63-48-2

w

246

Uuh

769 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

to 63-4M, 63-4&-2(2, 3), 8 W M ( W ) (Re
pealed).
7. SUtutes e=>212.5
Amendment to a statute is presumed
to have intended to change existing legal
rights.
g. SUtutes $=>206
In interpreting statutes, Supreme
Court had fundamental duty to give effect,
if possible, to every word of the statute.
9. Officers and Public Employees $=116
Later amendment of Government Immunity Act, granting officials immunity
even for gross negligence which arose in
course of their duties was substantive
change of law and did not retroactively
apply and bar citizens* suit for officials'
actions which predated amendment U.C.
A. 1953, 63-30-1 et seq.
10. Limitation of Actions e=>130<5)
Upon date of affirmation of dismissal
of timely first action, statute of limitations
was extended for one year in which to
allow plaintiffs to file a second action.
U.CA.1953, 78-12-26(4), 76-12-28(1), 7812-29(2), 78-12-40.

now-defunct Grove Finance Company ("the
investors"), brought suit against defendants Mirvin D. Borthick and W. Smoot
Brimhall, former commissioners of the
Utah Department of Financial Institutions
("the Commissioners"). The investors seek
to recover the amount of their lost investments from the Commissioners personally.
The trial court granted a summary- judgment in favor of the Commissioners, basing
its ruling on several alternative grounds.
The court held that the doctrine of res
judicata barred the action, that the Commissioners are immune from suit under the
Utah Governmental Immunity* Act and
that the applicable statute of limitations
bars this action. The investors challenge
all of these legal conclusions. We agree
with the investors that the trial court's
ruling was incorrect and reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Daniel F. Bench, Robert J. Debry, Phillip
B. Shell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and
appellants.
David L. Wilkinson, Paul M. Warner, Stephen J. Sorenson, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees.

In Madsen r. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627
(Utah 1983) [hereinafter Madsen / ] . the
plaintiffs in the instant case sued the State,
its Department of Financial Institutions,
and its Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Mirvin D. Borthick. in his official
capacity, claiming that they had lost most
of their investment in Grove Finance when
it became insolvent and that its insolvency
was due to the defendants' failure to perform their statu ton* duties.1 65? P.2d at
627-28. The trial court dismissed that case
for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted" because the investors, in suing the State and state officers in
their official capacities, had failed to file
the statutorily required notice of claim
within the allotted time. Id at 628; see
Utah Code Ann §§ 63-30-11. -12 (Supp.
1979). This Court upheld thai dismissal.
658 P.2d at 633

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiffs Richard D. and Nancy Madsen.
Boyd A. and Beatrice Swensen, Blaine and
Sheree Anderson, Hope A.. Cynthia, and
Ralph M. Hilton, Gene Helland, and the
Middle East Foundation, all investors in the

In our opinion in Madsen I, we indicated
that one reason for affirming the trial
court's dismissal was the investors' failure
to sue Commissioner Borthick in his individual capacity. See id at 632-33. Absent
an allegation that he had "acted or failed to
act through gross negligence, fraud or mal-

1. For a more detailed account of the factual
background of this case, set Madsen v Bonhick,

653 P.2d 627, 62£-29 (Utah 1953) thereinafter
Madsen J).

11. Limitation of Actions <£*118(2)
For purposes of determining timeliness
of suit suit is considered filed by filing of a
criminal complaint or service of summons.
not by filing of a notice of claim, where
that notice is a precondition tc suit. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 3(a).
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that this language should be ignored, that
we should look instead to the 1983 amendment of section 63-30-11, which deleted
this language and had the effect of expressly requiring service of a notice of
claim on the State in all suits against employees, whether or not any judgment
might ultimately be payable by the State.
They argue that the 1983 amendment was
intended to clarify the earlier statute and
to bring it into conformance with the legislature's true intention in enacting the earlier version of the statute.
[7,8) The Commissioners are correct in
concluding that the effect of the 1983 deletion of this language was to leave only the
first paragraph of the section, which requires that a notice of claim be filed with
the State in all suits brought against state
employees for actions taken in the course
of their employment We also agree that if
the State has a statutory duty to defend
employees in all such suits and if the
State's duty to indemnify is defined as encompassing its duty to defend employees,
the statutory provisions relating to the notice requirement and to indemnification are
more coherent since the 19S3 amendment
was made. However, we need no; consider
whether the legislature car> properly characterize the duty to defend as a duty- to
indemnify, for we find no suggestion in
sections 63-48-2 through -4 that it intended to do so. Those provisions clearly state
that there is no duty to indemnify by paying a judgment awarded in an action for
11. The Commissioners have made no persuasive
argument for disregarding the presumption that
an amendment is intended to change existing
legal rights See 1A \ Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction § 22.30 (Sands 4th rev.
ed 1985). Furthermore, in asking us to rule
that an entire sentence of the statute had absolutely no meaning at all, the\ have ignored our
fundamental duty to give effect, if possible to
every word of the statute. See Toicncc v.
Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175. 176. 397 V2d 9S4, 987
(1965); Stevenson v Sal: Lake GT\. 7 Utah 2d
28. 31, 317 ?2d 597, 599 (1937); 2A N Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.06
(Sands 4th rev. ed. 1984).
12. At the time this cause of action arose, section
63-30-4 of the Code provided in pan as follows:
The rcmed> against a governmental entity
or its employee for an injury caused by an act

gross negligence, fraud, or malice—in other words, an action brought against an
employee in an individual capacity. Moreover, the only possible import of the final
sentence of the second paragraph of section 63-30-11 is that there must be some
suits brought under the Act against employees of which the State need not be
notified. Unless we are to ignore that sentence entirely, the 1980 version of section
63-30-11 is more plainly read to expressly
except from the notice of claim requirement suits against employees in their individual capacities. If this were not enough
to undermine the Commissioners' position,
we find no indication in the 1983 amendment or elsewhere that the amendment
was intended to clarify a preexisting intention.11 For these reasons, we conclude that
in 1980, section 63-30-11 did not require
one suing state employees in their individual capacities to file a notice of claim with
the State. Therefore, the issue preclusion
branch of the doctrine of res judicata cannot support the summary judgment.
[9] Having rejected res judicata as a
basis for the summary judgment, we next
consider the correctness of the trial court's
ruling that the Commissioners are immune
from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act. The investors point out that the
Act, as it read at the time the cause of
action arose in 19S0. granted the Commissioners no immunity from personal liability
for gross negligence committed in their
individual capacities." The Commissioner omission which occurs during the performance of such employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authonry is, after the effective date of this act,
exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter
against the employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to
act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental enury in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the governmental
entity may be liable, but no employee shall be
held personally liable for acts or omissions
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties within the scope of employmen: or under color of authority, unless it is

